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Recent Developments 
California v. Acevedo: FOURTH 
AMENDMENT AUTHORIZES 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
CONT AINER WITHIN AUTO-
MOBILE WHERE PROB-
ABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 
EXISTS ONLY TO THE 
CONT AINER BUT NOT TO 
THE AUTOMOBILE ITSELF. 
In California v. Acevedo, 111 S. 
Ct. 1982 (1991), the United States 
Supreme Court held that police may 
conduct a warrantless search of a 
container within an automobile 
where probable cause existed only 
as to the container and not as to the 
vehicle itself. In so doing, the Court 
overruled the previous warrant re-
quirement established in United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U.S. 753 (1979). The Court 
found the Chadwick-Sanders rule, 
which required police to hold the 
container until a warrant was is-
sued, afforded only minimum pri-
vacy protection to individuals and 
impeded effective law enforcement. 
On October 28, 1987, a federal 
drug enforcement agent intercepted 
a package containing marijuana 
which was to have been delivered to 
the Federal Express office in Santa 
Ana, California. Theagentarranged 
for the Santa Ana police to examine 
the contents ofthe package, deliver 
it to the Federal Express office and 
arrest the claimant. After police 
followed the claimant to his apart-
ment and witnessed him throw the 
box and wrapping that contained the 
marijuana away, one ofthe officers 
left to obtain a search warrant. 
Shortly thereafter, Charles Acevedo 
entered the apartment and left with 
a brown paper bag which was the 
size ofthe bags of marijuana that the 
police had examined. Acevedo 
placed the bag in the trunk of his car 
and began to drive away. Officers 
stopped Acevedo, opened the trunk 
and the bag, and found marijuana. 
Acevedo was charged in state 
court with possession of marijuana 
for sale. He moved for suppression 
of the marijuana found in his car, 
butthe motion was denied. Acevedo 
then pleaded guilty but appealed the 
denial ofthe suppression motion. 
The California Court of Appeal 
reversed and held that because po-
lice only had probable cause to sus-
pect the paper bag contained drugs 
but lacked probable cause to suspect 
the car itself carried contraband, 
police could not open the bag with-
out a warrant. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1985. The court concluded that 
because probable cause was specifi-
cally directed at the bag, the case 
was controlled by Chadwick, which 
held that probable cause to search 
only the container in an automobile 
allowed police to seize the con-
tainer, but not search it without a 
warrant. The court noted the di-
chotomy between the Chadwick 
rule and the rule established in 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982). Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 
1985. Under Ross, probable cause 
to search an automobile permitted 
any container within the automobile 
to be opened without a warrant. 
The state's petition for review 
was denied by the Supreme Court of 
California. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to 
reexamine the law applicable to the 
search and seizure of a container 
within an automobile. 
In an opinion delivered by Jus-
tice Blackmun, the Supreme Court 
first acknowledged the general rule 
that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Id. An ex-
ception to the search warrant re-
quirement for contraband in a mov-
ing vehicle was first established in 
Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925). The Carroll deci-
sion held that the warrantless search 
of an automobile did not violate the 
warrant clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment when the search was based 
upon probable cause to believe that 
the vehicle containing evidence 
would disappear. Acevedo, III S. 
Ct. at 1985-86. 
The Court next examined the 
Carroll doctrine as it applied to 
containers within automobiles. The 
Court recognized two lines of cases 
which governed the searches of con-
tainers within automobiles. Ross 
clarified the scope of the Carroll 
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doctrine by establishing that con-
tainers and compartments could be 
included in a warrantless search of 
an automobile, provided the search 
was supported by probable cause. 
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1986. Ross, 
however, distinguished the Carroll 
doctrine from the separate rule gov-
erning searches of closed containers 
established in Chadwick and Sand-
search incident to a lawful arrest. 
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988. Be-
cause the Chadwick-Sanders rule 
did not substantially serve privacy 
interests, the Court held that sepa-
rate treatment for an automobile 
search extending only to a container 
within the vehicle was no longer 
required under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 1989. 
ers. Id. The Court further reasoned that 
In both Chadwick and Sand- the Chadwick-Sanders rule had 
ers, police conducted a warrantless "confusedcourtsandpoliceofficers 
search of luggage which was being and impeded effective law enforce-
transported in an automobile. AI- ment." Id. It was not always clear 
though police had probable cause to whether there was probable cause to 
suspect the luggage, they did not search a package or an entire ve-
have probable cause to suspect that hicle. Id. at 1989-90. For example, 
the vehicles were carrying contra- if an officer had probable cause to 
band. Id. at 1986-87. Inbothcases, believe that an automobile contained 
the Court refused to extend the drugs, began to search the vehicle 
Carroll doctrine to include the war- and immediately discovered a pack-
rant less search of luggage merely age of drugs, arguably either rule 
because it happened to be trans- could apply. Id. 
ported in an automobile. Id. at This confusion was further dem-
1987. The Court emphasized the onstrated by the factthat since 1982, 
heightened privacy interest a person state courts and federal courts of 
expects in his or her luggage and appeals had been reversed in their 
personal effects, and concluded that Fourth Amendment holdings 
this interest was not diminished by twenty-nine times. Id. at 1990. 
the presence of such items in a ve- Because of this confusion, the Court 
hicle. Id. at 1986-87. concluded that it was better''to adopt 
In overruling the Chadwick- one clear-cut rule to govern auto-
Sanders rule, the Court reasoned mobile searches and eliminate the 
that the rule afforded minimum pri- warrant requirement for closed con-
vacy protection to individuals and tainers set forth in Sanders . . . . 
impeded effective law enforcement. The interpretation of the Carroll 
Id. at 1989. The Court recognized doctrine set forth in Ross now ap-
that "a container found after a gen- plies to all searches of containers 
eral search ofthe automobile and a found in an automobile." Id. at 
container found in a car after a lim- 1991. Thus, police may conduct a 
ited search for the container are warrantless search of an automobile 
equally easy for the police to store or any container in the automobile 
and for the suspect to hide or de- as long as the search is supported by 
stroy." Id. at 1988. The Court noted probable cause. Id. 
that under New York v. Belton, By its decision in Acevedo, the 
453 U.S. 454 (1981), law enforce- Supreme Court simplified the con-
ment officers could not only seize a fusing law surrounding the automo-
container and hold it until a warrant bile exception to the warrant clause 
was obtained, but could also search of the Fourth Amendment. While 
containers without a warrant as a this may lead to more effective law 
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enforcement, the privacy interests 
of the individual may have been 
compromised. The fact that privacy 
rights in personal effects are lost 
immediately as one enters a moving 
vehicle may lead to an abuse of 
police power and less protection for 
the individual. 
- Kim-Haylee Loewenstein Band 
Florida v. Bostick: POLICE 
OFFICERS MAY BOARD BUS 
AND RANDOMLY ASK 
PASSENGERS FOR CON-




In Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 
2382 (1991), the Supreme Court 
decided that a seizure did not auto-
matically occur when police offic-
ers boarded buses and asked passen-
gers for consent to search their lug-
gage. The Court stated that while 
the Fourth Amendment does pro-
hibit unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, it does not prohibit voluntary 
co-operation. 
During a stopover in Ft. Lauder-
dale, two police officers boarded a 
bus and, without reasonable suspi-
cion, requested permission to search 
the defendant's (Bostick) luggage. 
The police officers did not use 
threats, and Bostick was explicitly 
told that he had the right to refuse 
consent. Bostick consented to the 
search which led police to find co-
caine in his luggage. 
Bostick argued that a seizure took 
place when police officers boarded 
the bus and asked for consent to 
search his luggage. Bostick moved 
to suppress the evidence on the ba-
sis that it was improperly seized in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights. The Florida District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the trial court's 
denial of Bostick's motion, but cer-
tified the question of seizure to the 
